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Introduction

S

enator John McCain (R-AZ) has proposed two major changes to the corporate tax
code: cutting the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 25 percent and allowing
corporations to deduct the full cost of investments in technology and equipment
in the first year, an accounting process known as expensing. The first proposal aims to
enhance U.S. economic competitiveness, create jobs, and increase wages. The second
proposal aims in particular to boost capital expenditures and “reward investment in
cutting-edge technologies.”1

Both measures, if enacted by Congress, would greatly alter the role of corporate revenues in our tax system. Corporate taxes account for a significant share of the federal
government’s revenues (about 14 percent in 2007),2 financing critical investments in
national defense, infrastructure, and human services. The corporate tax is crucial for
the overall progressivity of the tax system, prevents individuals from sheltering income
in corporations, and enables some measure of regulatory control over corporations.
There are major problems with the corporate tax code, of course, such as the provisions that encourage U.S. companies to locate jobs overseas. Reforms of the tax code
to address these problems—including proposals that would close loopholes and lower
the corporate tax rate—are worthy of serious consideration. Some changes, however,
would make these problems worse.
This paper examines Sen. McCain’s corporate tax proposals on tax sheltering, growth
and competitiveness, equity, and cost. In each case this proposal raises significant concerns. Specifically:
 Allowing corporations to expense their investments in new equipment and technology, in the context of the current tax code, invites massive tax sheltering.
 Cutting the corporate tax rate to 25 percent from 35 percent would also drain the
federal treasury, without improving the competitiveness of the United States as a
place to do business or of its corporations in the global marketplace.
 Reducing the corporate rate will overwhelmingly benefit upper-income taxpayers.
 Combining rate cuts and expensing would be enormously expensive, reducing corporate revenues by as much as 75 percent.
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Senator McCain’s
Corporate Tax Proposals
The McCain Proposals Invite a Wave of New Tax Shelters
Sen. McCain’s proposals would create a new generation of tax shelters that are immune from legal challenge. Currently, companies depreciate—deduct from their corporate taxes over several years—the costs of capital investments. Sen. McCain proposes to
allow a 100 percent current deduction, also known as expensing, for these capital investments, reducing corporations’ taxable income dollar-for-dollar. 3
In other words, rather than deducting a part of the cost of a new machine in the year
of the purchase, McCain would allow companies to deduct the entire cost in that year.
Basic tax classes teach the uncontroversial proposition, known as the Cary Brown theorem, that expensing for capital investments results in normal corporate profits, or profits
earned in a competitive marketplace, being taxed at a zero rate. Intuitively, this means
that only so-called above-normal profits (monopoly profits) will be subject to the corporate tax, and most corporations will not pay tax most of the time.
The sheltering opportunity arises because Sen. McCain proposes expensing in the
context of the current corporate tax structure, including the deduction for interest
when a company takes out a loan to purchase equipment. This means the company
may deduct the interest on that loan. Sen. McCain’s proposal would mean that a company could immediately deduct not only the interest on the money borrowed to buy a
machine and part of the machine’s cost, but the full cost of the machine itself.
This combination would open up almost unlimited opportunities for sheltering income.
In fact, for many corporations, the proposal would result in a negative effective tax rate
on many investments—rather than paying a tax on profits the corporation would get
money from the government in addition to their profits.
Here’s how it might work. Suppose Acme Corporation borrows $1,000 with a 10 percent interest rate and invests it all in new equipment. Under the McCain plan, Acme
can deduct its $1,000 of investment, resulting in a reduction of its tax bill by $250
(assuming a 25 percent corporate tax rate under the other provisions of McCain’s corporate tax proposal). Acme can then invest the $250 and earn an extra $25 (assuming
a 10 percent interest rate). Under normal competitive conditions, it will also earn $100
(10 percent) on its $1,000 investment, which would result in $25 of tax, or the same
amount it earns on investing the tax refund.

2

w w w . a m e r i c a n p r o g r e s s a c t i o n . o r g

The upshot: The corporation’s effective
tax rate is zero. But if Acme can also
deduct $100 of interest on its loan, the
effective tax rate becomes negative. At a
25 percent rate, the company will be able
to avoid paying $25 in taxes on another
$100 in income. Of course, borrowing terms will shift over time, as will the
amount of money a corporation could
earn by lending out its tax savings under
McCain’s 100 percent depreciation proposal. But the bottom line remains an
enormous tax shelter.
On its face, McCain’s idea is similar to
one of the proposals advanced by President Bush’s Tax Reform Advisory Panel,
the “Growth and Investment” tax proposal,
which likewise would have allowed expensing of corporate capital investment. But
the Advisory Panel proposed to ignore all
financial flows, resulting in no deduction for
interest.4 The Panel described the elimination of the interest deduction as “essential.”
Specifically, the Panel said that:
“Allowing both expensing of new
investments and an interest deduction
would result in a net tax subsidy to
new investment. Projects that would
not be economical in a no-tax world
might become viable just because of
the tax subsidy. This would result in
economic distortions and adversely
impact economic activity.”5
To understand the context of McCain’s
depreciation proposal, it is useful to
review the recent history of tax sheltering.
In 1981, President Reagan enacted one
of the biggest effective corporate tax rate
cuts by adopting super-accelerated depreciation deductions and an investment tax
credit that together were equivalent to
the expensing McCain is now proposing. Reagan, like McCain, did nothing to
limit interest deductibility.
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The result was a wave of tax shelters.
Individuals borrowed heavily, used the
borrowed funds to invest in ways that
benefited from expensing, and deducted
the interest. The combination of expensing and interest deductibility resulted in a
negative tax rate for these shelters. Corporate income tax revenues plummeted
to 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product by the end of 1985, from 2.4 percent
of GDP in 1980.6
Congress brought the individual tax
shelter wave to an end in 1986, limiting
interest deductibility for individuals and
enacting the at-risk and passive activity
loss rules (which segregate losses from
passive activities and prevent them from
sheltering active income).7 The McCain
proposals invite a new round of sheltering like that of the 1980s. Taking advantage of these proposals will not require
extensive legal or accounting help. The
shelters will be very simple to adopt.
And once again, new loopholes in the
corporate income tax could spill over into
the personal income tax. In an environment in which the personal income tax rate
stays at 35 percent (or higher, if Congress
refuses to extend the Bush tax cuts at the
highest income levels), there would be
massive incentives to shift income from the
individual to the corporate sector.
An important justification for maintaining
a corporate tax is that individuals would
otherwise be able to shelter their income
in corporations and defer the individual
tax indefinitely. The weapons that the
Internal Revenue Service can use to combat such shifting, such as the accumulated
earnings tax and transfer pricing, are
hopelessly inadequate.
Thus, it is likely that the result of enacting Sen. McCain’s proposal would be a
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decline in not only corporate tax revenues, but in individual income tax revenues as well. In fact, President Reagan’s
1981 corporate tax cuts had to be quickly
reversed in the face of larger than
expected revenue losses.

Tax Changes to Promote
Growth and Competitiveness
Will Aid Neither
Sen. McCain justifies cutting the corporate tax rate by arguing that a rate cut will
improve growth that is “essential to U.S.
competitiveness.” He states that “America
was once a low-tax business environment,
but as our trade partners lowered their
rates, America failed to keep pace, leaving
us with the second-highest rate among the
world’s advanced economies.”8
The broad argument about growth is
not compelling. Recent experience indicates that corporate rate cuts, like the
temporary reduction in the tax rate on
dividends from foreign subsidiaries from
35 percent to 5.25 percent, have resulted
in increased profits for U.S. corporations but no increase in jobs or overall
economic growth.9 It is true that the
United States now has the second-highest
nominal corporate tax rate, but two facts
suggest that the nominal tax rate does
not diminish the competitiveness of the
United States or U.S. corporations.
First, the effective tax rates in most other
countries—the rates actually paid—
are now higher than here. Second, we
do not currently tax U.S. corporations’
foreign-sourced income—or income
from outside the United States—which
means reducing the corporate tax rate
is irrelevant to competitiveness against
foreign corporations. Both of these
points merit detailed exploration.
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Comparing Tax Rates
The key determinant for competitiveness
is not the nominal corporate tax rate, or
the rate on paper, but rather the effective rate—the rate companies actually
pay. Deductions for interest payments
and investments can reduce actual taxes
as a percentage of income well below the
nominal rate. Companies that actually
pay more in taxes may be less competitive, but if companies merely appear to pay
more but do not, that that has no effect.
In the United States, companies look like
they are paying more because we now
have the second-highest nominal tax rate
(after Japan) among the members of the
Organization for Economic Competitiveness and Development.10 But the underlying story is different. Other countries
have indeed lowered their nominal rates
over the last two decades, but their effective rates did not substantially decline
between 1986 and 2008.
In fact, OECD average revenues from the
corporate tax rose to 3 percent of GDP
from 2 percent of GDP over this period.11
In contrast, U.S. corporate tax revenue
declined to between 1.5 percent and 2 percent of GDP in the late 1990s to 2003
before rebounding sharply to 3 percent of
GDP from 2003 to 2006 (the last year in
which complete data are available).12
Thus, the argument that we need to
reduce our corporate tax rate because
our trading partners have reduced theirs
does not make sense. Our trading partners have reduced their nominal rate, but
they have also broadened their corporate
tax base by taxing more kinds of income,
reducing deductions and credits, or some
combination of the two. Sen. McCain’s
proposal to slash the corporate tax rate
to 25 percent and introduce 100 percent
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expensing would, in contrast, sharply
reduce the corporate tax rate and narrow
the base, resulting in a much lower effective tax rate in the United States than
among our main trading partners.

The Impact of Tax Rates on
Corporate Competitiveness

Treasury and the Congressional Budget
Office is that the corporate tax falls on
shareholders in the short run and on all
capital providers (investors in the corporate and non-corporate sectors) in the
longer run because capital flows from the
corporate to the non-corporate sector.13
But the incidence of the corporate tax
has been debated for the last 50 years.

The U.S. corporate tax rate is also irrelevant to the competitiveness of U.S. companies abroad because it does not apply
to U.S. corporations’ overseas earnings.
When U.S. corporations compete with
foreign corporations overseas, they can
avoid paying U.S. corporate tax on their
active business income by choosing to
defer those taxes.

One of Sen. McCain’s economic advisors,
American Enterprise Institute Senior Fellow Kevin Hassett, argues that corporate
taxes are “in large part” passed on to
labor through lower wages and therefore
corporate tax cuts “can” increase wages.14
The important word is “can.” How likely
is it that U.S. corporations will pass a tax
cut through to their employees?

In fact, the overall tax burden on U.S.
corporations’ foreign operations is very
low precisely because they take advantage of tax holidays and other techniques
to minimize their foreign tax burden.
Reducing the U.S. corporate tax rate has
no impact on these operations.

To address this question, we need to
know why a corporate tax cut might be
passed on to wage earners. The obvious
answer is that because of the decline in
union membership and the increase in
globalization, wages have become more
elastic (responsive to changes). Corporations can cut wages in response to corporate tax hikes because there are no unions
to threaten a strike, and because they can
credibly threaten to move jobs overseas if
the workers do not accept pay cuts.

Similarly, the U.S. corporate tax rate is
irrelevant to operations of foreign corporate competitors in the United States
because both U.S. and foreign businesses
face the same tax rate—the U.S. corporate tax rate. Reducing U.S. corporate
tax rates, even if it were a true cut in the
effective tax rate, would have no impact on
the competitiveness of foreign vs. U.S. corporations. Competitiveness is not an argument for cutting the U.S. corporate tax rate.

Proposals Undercut
Tax Progressivity
Who benefits when taxes on corporations are cut? The longstanding assumption of both the U.S. Department of the
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But these same factors mean that the
corporations are highly unlikely to pass
the benefits of tax cuts to their employees. Instead, corporations would probably
accumulate increased profits. After all, U.S.
corporations in recent years have boosted
their cash reserves, engaged in expensive
share buybacks to please shareholders, and
boosted the pay of corporate executives—
amid one of the least enriching business
cycles for average wage earners.
The beneficiaries of any corporate tax
cuts would be corporate management,
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who would be able to further boost their
pay packets drawing from larger piles
of cash, and shareholders. In fact, using
increased profits to raise wages when there
is no economic compulsion to do so would
contradict corporate management’s obligation to increase value for shareholders.
The argument that cutting the corporate
tax rate will lead to wage gains is also
inconsistent with the standard argument
for the recent tax cuts on dividends and
capital gains that Sen. McCain would
retain. The standard argument for these
tax cuts is that the corporate income
underlying dividends and capital gains
has already been taxed at 35 percent at
the corporate level. If Sen. McCain and
his advisers are right that the cost of
corporate taxes to companies is mostly
shifted to labor, then what is their justification for taxing dividends and capital
gains at 15 percent, less than half of the
rate for ordinary income? If labor pays
most of the corporate tax, then owners
of capital should be taxed on both dividends and capital gains at or near the full
individual rate.

The Cost to the
Federal Budget
Sen. McCain’s chief economic adviser,
former Congressional Budget Office
director Douglas Holtz-Eakin, estimates
that the reduction of the corporate tax
rate by itself would cost the Treasury
$100 billion a year. This figure, however,
is probably low because it does not take
into account the sheltering activity that
is made possible by the combination of
expensing and interest deductibility.
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Len Burman, co-director of the Tax
Policy Center, estimates that the rate
reduction and expensing together would
cut corporate tax revenue for the federal
government in half, an estimate that he
says is “probably conservative.”15 Another
approach to the estimate is to use the
2003 revenues. That is when the most
recent corporate tax shelter movement
was at its height. In 2003, corporate tax
revenues were only $132 billion. Against
that benchmark, the McCain rate cut
would amount to a 75 percent reduction
in corporate tax revenues.16
The problem with such deep cuts in
revenues is, of course, that if we want to
avoid an exploding deficit—and McCain
has promised to erase the deficit by the
end of his first term—then he needs to
find spending cuts to offset the revenue
reductions. McCain has indicated he
would consider eliminating the Section 199 tax credit for “manufacturers” (defined broadly to include software
writers, construction firms, and architects), the low-income housing credit, and
unspecified tax breaks for life insurers,
credit unions, and exporters.17
Each of these programs, however, boasts
strong lobby groups, and some have
problematic distributive consequences. For
example, trading the low-income housing
credit for a corporate tax reduction seems
particularly egregious. Thus, it seems
highly unlikely that a President McCain
could or should be able get all of these tax
revenue enhancing measures past Congress. Even if he could, these provisions
would raise only a fraction of the revenues
needed to pay for his tax cuts.
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Conclusion

C

orporate taxes are a critical source of revenue for the nation. They provide a
barrier against massive personal income tax avoidance. And they are part and
parcel of our nation’s progressive tax traditions. Sen. McCain’s corporate tax
proposals shatter each of these important attributes of the U.S. corporate tax system
without providing much at all in the way of increased U.S. corporate competitiveness or
wider economic prosperity.

Instead, Sen. McCain’s proposals would mark the beginning of a new wave of tax
shelters, contribute little to growth and competitiveness, heavily benefit higher-income
taxpayers, and lead to unaffordable losses in revenue.
The U.S. economy performed quite nicely in the 1990s, with record growth in productivity and a decrease in income inequality. There is no credible evidence that restoring the tax
rates that prevailed in that era (39.6 percent for individuals, 35 percent for corporations,
with the full individual rate applying to corporate dividends) would impede U.S. economic
growth or competitiveness. The result would be a much more equitable distribution of the
tax burden, and a real chance to eliminate the current federal budget deficit.
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